Imagine you want to join to a brand new association which o ers to provide useful services on the net. To allow electronic payment, this association provides a DSS implementation with public parameters p = 1007386175274283816733054843443587432664299802160928 9724334546391745980774853739798193524368725087200030 875184211970398850090583601122813103828861440790761 and q = 759902064211816970120975637406935605590678547999: To check the connection, the server requests you to sign the message \This is just a test". Then time goes, and your bank warns you that you need to feed your account after your last check of $9; 302. Of course, the manager of the association has just disappeared with the money obtained from all the 215 members! (This is a $2; 000; 000 swindle.)
? Laboratoire d'Informatique de l'Ecole Normale Sup erieure, research group a liated with the CNRS This attack comes from a special forgery of the public parameter. It is not applicable to the accurate DSS suggested in 2] since it requires the production of a certi cate of good forgery. This attacks however proves that the signer must check the certi cate himself (which is not explicitly mentioned is the Standard), which may be a very cumbersome task for low cost devices.
In this paper, we explain how to perform this attack. We also show a similar attack against DSS with the suggested certi cate of good forgery with a complexity equivalent to 2 74 SHS computations. The complexities of the attacks do not depend on the length of the prime p used in the signature scheme.
Signatures based on discrete logarithm
The rst digital signature algorithm based on the discrete logarithm problem (namely, the discrete log problem in the group ZZ p , given a prime number p) was the ElGamal signature 4]. This scheme produces quite long signatures and is also subject to Bleichenbacher's attack which uses small factors of p ? 1 3] .
The Schnorr signature 6, 7] repars those two shortcomings by using an element g whose order is a 160-bit prime factor q of p ? 1. The underlying group for the discrete log problem is thus a subgroup of ZZ p with order q. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 2] also uses such a g.
In the following, we only consider the case of the DSS scheme. In the signature scheme, the message is processed through the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) 1] which produces a 160-bit digest. This value then appears as a power of g. Hence, the real hash value is not the output of SHS, but rather the message digest reduced modulo q. Since q is less than the largest output of SHS, this may produce collisions.
For completeness, we now recall the outlines of DSS. p, q and g are the public parameters chosen by the authority. p is a 512-bit prime (or a 1024-bit prime in stronger versions), q is a 160-bit prime factor of p ? 1, and g is a primitive qth root of 1 modulo p. Each user has a secret key x (which is a 160-bit integer) and publishes a corresponding 512-bit public key y = g x mod p. The signature of an arbitrary message m using a (secret) fresh random 160-bit integer k is a (r; s) pair of 160-bit integers any signature from any user of message m is also a valid signature of message m 0 . We call such a pair a collision for DSS. Of course, since SHS is considered as a secure hash function, it is still infeasible to get a collision. More precisely, the complexity of the best attack (based on the birthday paradox) has a complexity of 2 80 . Similarly, it may be infeasible, given a 160-bit prime q, to nd a collision on SHS mod q. It is however possible to construct q from an (un)willing collision (m; m 0 ).
More concretely, from a random pair (m; m 0 ), we can check whether or not q = jSHS(m)?SHS(m 0 )j is a 160-bit prime. The integer jSHS(m)?SHS(m 0 )j is obviously a 160-bit integer with probability 1=2. Then, a random 160-bit integer is a prime with probability approximately 1=160 log 2 1=111, thanks to the Prime Number Theorem. Hence, with an average of 222 trials, we obtain a collision which de nes a valid prime q. It is not di cult, given a prime q, to issue valid p and g, for instance by following the generation algorithm provided in 2].
The example given in the introduction uses the message m = This is just a test which is encoded as 54686973 20697320 6a757374 20612074 65737480 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000098 in hexadecimal and its hash value is SHS(m) = 653095248274681173784642234520335115855431883588: The second message is m 0 = Transfer $9,302 on account XYZ and its hash value is SHS(m 0 ) = 1412997312486498143905617871927270721446110431587:
which is a 160-bit prime. Then one can issue a 512-bit prime p such that q divides p ? 1. 3 The public parameters generation of DSS The description of DSS suggests that q is rst generated from a random seed by a speci c algorithm, then p and g are issued from q by the same seed. The seed should be used as a certi cate of a honest forgery for p and q. The previous attack suggests that this feature must be used.
Is the attack really thwarted by this generation algorithm? We recall that q is set to (SHS(seed) SHS(seed +1)) _ 2 159 _ 1 until it is a prime where and _ denote the bitwise exclusive and inclusive or respectively. (We notice that we need in average about 55 trials to get a prime q since this is a random 160-bit odd integer.) Let seed = m and seed +1 = m 0 . The same attack holds whenever jSHS(seed) ? SHS(seed+1)j = (SHS(seed) SHS(seed +1)) _ 2 159 _ 1
Since this occurs with probability 1   2  1  4  3  4 157 2 ?68:16 , we obtain that 2 73:95 trials are required on average to mount this attack.
The Standard says that parameters p and q shall be generated as suggested above, or using other FIPS approved security methods. This study may thus be helpful for proposing other generation algorithms. For instance, we can suggest to set q = SHS(seed) _ 2 159 _ 1 until q is valid. 4 On the g parameter Surprisingly, no particular care is required for parameter g. Thus, fake gs like g = 0 or 1 are implicitly accepted! Actually, a dishonest authority can provide g = 1 to a user and make him accept any signature forged by r = (y k mod p) mod q s = r k mod q: In a more dedicated attack, the authority provides g = y mod p to Alice, where y is the public key of Bob, and forges Bob's signatures by r = (y k mod p) mod q s = SHS(m) + r k mod q:
We thus suggest to add a certi cate of valid forgery of g when issuing the public parameters.
Conclusion
We performed an attack against DSS which allows the issuing autority to forge valid public parameters with hidden collisions. It con rms internal problems in the signature scheme which were already predicted by Pointcheval and Stern in 5] because of not using a random pattern in the hash function like in the Schnorr signature 6]. We have proved that when the issuing authority is not trusted, all users must then check proper generation of the public parameters. We also showed how to adapt this attack to the generation algorithm suggested in the Standard within a complexity 2 74 . Even if the complexity were smaller, the attack would still not be so dramatic because it is easy to detect. This should be registered as an existing (bad) property of DSS though. This attack can easily be avoided by using a 161-bit prime q, or by dropping the most signi cant bit of SHS (or by setting the least signi cant bit to a constant before using it in the signature scheme), or by padding a random pattern before hashing. Its complexity can also be increased up to 2 80 by using a stronger certi cate-based generation algorithm for p and q.
We also presented attacks based on malicious forgery of the g parameter. We thus recommand to use a suitable certi cate of honest forgery for g as well as for p and q.
